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Editorial 
Control of Nosocomial Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus: Where Shall We Send Our 
Hospital Director Next Time? 
Stephan Harbarth, MD, MS; Didier Pittet, MD, MS 
All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and 
there are victims, and it is up to us, so far as possible, not to 
join forces with the pestilences.—Albert Camus1 
In the midst of a hospital-wide campaign to combat 
the rising incidence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA) at our institution, our hospital director, 
together with other high-ranking hospital administrators, 
traveled to Boston, Massachusetts, to visit a prestigious 
teaching hospital and learn more about the way health care 
is being delivered in the United States. Apparently, our 
director was impressed by the efficiency and quality of 
healthcare delivery he encountered. Moreover, after 
returning to Geneva, he informed senior staff members 
that hospital officials in Boston had told him that their hos-
pital no longer applied isolation precautions to control the 
spread of MRSA, 35 years after the first description of a 
hospital-wide MRSA outbreak in that city.2 At the same 
time, we knew that we had had more than 700 new MRSA 
cases in our hospital in 2002 and that substantial efforts 
would be necessary to stop the spread of MRSA. Those 
who are facing endemic MRSA infections may ask them-
selves whether the hospital in Boston is really the kind of 
role model we want to follow in the 21st century. Is it time 
to give up fighting and searching for MRSA?3 Is the "war" 
over?4 Or, alternatively, should we not be considering 
increased efforts to control this persistent pathogen with 
screening policies and isolation precautions? 
Endemic MRSA cross-infection represents a global 
problem, although major differences in MRSA control have 
been achieved with different strategies.5"7 A few countries 
such as Finland and the Netherlands have managed to con-
trol MRSA to a low level using active surveillance cultures 
and contact precautions.8,9 Other countries (eg, Canada 
and Germany) that were "MRSA naive" until recently have 
not installed stringent, nationwide MRSA surveillance and 
control measures and are now in the middle of some large 
MRSA epidemics.10-12 Some countries with high preva-
lences (eg, Belgium and France) have managed to stabilize 
the situation in confined geographic areas. For instance, in 
a large set of teaching hospitals in the Paris area 
(Assistance Publique-Hdpitaux de Paris; 25,000 beds) 
where a stringent program for MRSA control was set up in 
1993, the proportion of MRSA among clinical isolates of S. 
aureus decreased between 1993 and 2002 from 55% to 25% 
in patients in the intensive care unit and overall from 39% to 
29% in patients in the acute care unit (V. Jarlier, MD, per-
sonal communication, April 16, 2003). Yet, few countries 
such as Japan have simply ignored this public health prob-
lem for more than three decades. 
Perhaps second only to Japan, the United States has 
the unenviable position of being one of the world leaders in 
the prevalence of methicillin resistance and of reduced sus-
ceptibility to glycopeptides among S. aureus isolates.61314 
For instance, more than 50% of all S. aureus isolates in U.S. 
intensive care units are now methicillin resistant and, 
recently, the first high-level vancomycin-resistant S. aureus 
isolates were reported from the United States.1315 This wor-
risome finding suggests that previous initiatives to stop the 
spread of multidrug-resistant S. aureus in the United States 
have failed. In this context, it is surprising to read the fol-
lowing statement from U.S. public health authorities 
(unsubstantiated by data) on a frequently visited web site: 
"Standard Precautions, as described in the 'Guideline for 
Isolation Precautions in Hospitals,'16 should control the 
spread of MRSA in most instances."17 To our understand-
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ing, standard precautions have been required by federal 
regulation for 7 years in all U.S. healthcare facilities but this 
does not seem to have resulted in control of the problem. 
One carefully performed study showed that MRSA trans-
mission occurred 16 times more often with standard pre-
cautions than when colonized patients were identified with 
surveillance cultures and cared for using contact precau-
tions.18 Another recent study from the Netherlands sug-
gested an even higher relative risk for spread when 
patients were cared for using standard precautions as com-
pared with isolation precautions.19 Indeed, many reports 
have stressed the importance of active screening policies 
and contact isolation for MRSA-positive patients, especially 
in high-risk units.20'21 
In this issue of Infection Control and Hospital 
Epidemiology, Saiman et al.22 report the containment of a 
MRSA outbreak in a neonatal intensive care unit in which 
screening cultures, contact isolation, and cohorting of 
neonates and healthcare workers were being successfully 
used. By contrast, an adult intensive care unit in Australia 
used only standard precautions and had a high rate of 
MRSA transmission, as shown by regular admission and 
discharge screening.23 The difference in outcome between 
the two units is striking and one is tempted to implicate the 
differing control strategies. 
The conclusions of these two articles support the 
recommendations of a new guideline also published in this 
issue of Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology regard-
ing the control of nosocomial spread of MRSA and van-
comycin-resistant enterococci (VRE).24 In this guideline, 
Muto et al. recommend that hospitals in the United States 
and elsewhere implement surveillance cultures and contact 
precautions to control cross-infection of multidrug-resis-
tant gram-positive cocci. Indeed, previous guidelines have 
failed to contain MRSA, which has continued to increase 
dramatically despite their use.25 The new guideline consid-
ers this fact, extensively reviews the relevant literature, 
covers many areas of uncertainty, and provides a sound 
framework for MRSA and VRE control in the future. It rep-
resents a robust and well-documented summary of the 
available evidence. Therefore, we welcome and commend 
this guideline. 
A limitation in the management and prevention of 
nosocomial infections has been the lack of evidence from 
randomized trials. Recent work on a variety of topics makes 
this clear. For example, the authors of a recent guideline on 
the management of catheter-related infections noted that 
randomized trials were unavailable for most of the areas 
covered.26 Likewise, the recently published hand hygiene 
guideline emphasized the need for the use of alcohol hand 
rubs despite the absence of any randomized trials showing 
that this would reduce infection rates.27 Perhaps in part due 
to the lack of such studies, widespread misconceptions 
about the value of alcohol-based hand antisepsis persisted 
through the 20th century.28 Nevertheless, the conclusions 
and recommendations of both of these guidelines appear 
reasonable. For many important questions regarding infec-
tion control and MRSA control in particular, we may never 
obtain data from randomized trials because of the general 
lack of funding, feasibility issues, and ethical dilemmas. 
Thus, the opinions of experts critically appraising the avail-
able epidemiologic evidence that supports infection control 
practices will likely always remain a key component of 
guidelines in our field. 
We consider the conclusions of the guideline for pre-
venting nosocomial spread of MRSA and VRE to be well 
reasoned and correct based on the available data. If all pub-
lic health authorities were to adopt this guideline and all 
healthcare facilities were to follow its proactive approach, it 
is likely that the almost universal failure to control MRSA in 
U.S. healthcare facilities would be reversed. It might be 
argued that some of the studies, such as that by Saiman et 
al. in this issue, used additional measures such as cohort-
ing or an isolation ward. However, many of the studies 
reporting successful control did not use these two mea-
sures and virtually all did report using active surveillance 
cultures and contact precautions, which seem to be almost 
a sine qua non for success. Studies reporting successful 
control without these measures seem to be the exception 
rather than the rule, and the success reported in such stud-
ies has often been modest.29 
We feel certain that those who have not read the 
many studies referenced by the new guideline will be 
tempted to criticize its bold proposal that all healthcare 
facilities start controlling MRSA and VRE infections. 
Whatever the criticism, health authorities and hospital epi-
demiologists are well advised to put teeth and money into 
their control efforts as recommended by the guideline. 
Hospital administrators in particular should not wait until 
nosocomial acquisition rates of MRSA become a key quali-
ty indicator for hospital benchmarking.530 Clearly, MRSA 
control is cost-effective, and particularly so in high-risk 
units.20'3132 We, like others, are convinced that there is no 
level of MRSA prevalence for which active control mea-
sures are not warranted. Precautions to combat transmis-
sion of multidrug-resistant microorganisms such as MRSA 
and VRE on a routine basis should find their way into all 
hospitals with the ultimate benefit of improving patient 
safety. 
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